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From Suffragist to Apologist:
The Loss of Feminist Politics in a Politically Correct Patriarchy
By Ashleigh Harrisi
Abstract
This article discusses the ways in which feminist politics have been dissolved
since the 1980s, most notably in the popular cultural sphere, so as to make feminism
appear anachronistic. It considers how various discourses and texts have sought to efface
the political impetus of feminism through claims to political correctness. Young women
are thus interpolated into a more insidious patriarchy that re-inscribes female shame,
guilt, passivity and silence in both professional and personal contexts, at the same as it
espouses the discourse of equal rights. Many are not only apologizing for the equal rights
that been “granted” to them, but have also become apologists for this “benevolent”
patriarchy. This article opens the debate as to how feminist politics may be revived given
the ubiquity of these de-politicising discourses.
Key Words: third wave feminism, South Africa, backlash
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*

This article emerges out of a series of observations about how feminist studies have
been eroded away in academic institutions the world over, partially through the
systematic closure of gender studies courses, partially because of the claims that feminist
ideologies have been incorporated into syllabi and are, therefore, no longer necessary as a
separate area of study, and partially through the vaguely defined, yet thoroughly
maintained, argument that in an era of sensitivity to the ways in which power is
distributed in various societies, feminist politics are no longer “necessary.” In the course
of this article I will dismantle these types of arguments, and will suggest instead that such
opinions do not emerge out of an increased social and political awareness, but rather out
of a more insidious form of patriarchal distribution of power in a variety of societies.
The accusation by the Western world that it is in the Third World and the Orient
that patriarchies continue to exist in the most severe forms is not only an example of
continued Western arrogance, xenophobia and racism, but also a very serious refusal to
analyze and engage with the complex workings of patriarchy within Western societies
themselves. Furthermore, Western societies’ assumptions that the areas in which
patriarchy exerts its oppressive force are now predominantly restricted to domestic
violence and rape attempt to reduce patriarchy to the realm of the personal and thereby
refuse to acknowledge the broader socio-political manifestations of patriarchy that often
underlie such personal violations, and, in my view, often seek to condone such behavior.
A pertinent example of this is the construction of masculinity in popular culture and the
press. The ease with which the blame for patriarchal oppression is apportioned to
“cultural difference” is a highly problematic issue and “restricting” patriarchy to the
realms of sexual violation and rape is yet another mode of ensuring that responsibility for
continued patriarchal modalities of power is assigned to the space of social “other,”
whether that be the criminal rapist or the culturally defined other. This article seeks to
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investigate the patriarchal modalities of power that infuse mass Western culture, the
reasons why these modalities are negated as being patriarchal, and the problems this
poses for contemporary feminist politics.
We are all familiar with the modes through which patriarchy defined and
entrenched itself in the early part of the twentieth century in the Western world, most
notably through invoking discourses of nature and Christian morality.ii However, the
modes through which patriarchies adapted their use of such discourses, seemingly as a
response to increasing demands by suffragists, feminists and those sympathetic to the call
for equal rights, but in reality as a guise to perpetuate patriarchal systems of power, is
seldom considered. A salient example of such an expedient form of adaptation can be
seen in the poster campaigns to recruit women for the First World War effort in Britain.
Immediately prior to the war, severe anti-suffrage campaigns employed the discourses of
ethics, religious faith, and nature as unquestionable justifications for women’s passive
and domestic places within society.iii However, the campaign to recruit women for the
war effort, particularly for the women’s land army and the munitions factories, suddenly
represented women as strong-willed, adult, noble, physically able and adept in work
places previously considered the exclusive domain of men. The ethical and god-fearing
woman was now expected to move from the private to the public sphere. That this
politically shrewd depiction of women clearly emerged to suit the greater needs of the
nation is an effective example of the adaptability of patriarchy, of which there are
countless other examples that are beyond the scope of this argument.
The focus of this article is a more contemporary context in which patriarchy adapts
to its most subtle and insidious form: a form that uses a variety of sophisticated disguises,
one of which is the discourse of political correctness. This adaptation emerges out of the
relative success in the socio-economic sphere of the post-war feminist movements in the
Western world which gave middle-class women suffrage, reproductive rights, the space
in which to critique misogynist and patriarchal cultural and media production, and many
other gains. These gains all owed a great deal to the increasing use of liberal humanist
discourses across the globe. It is this liberal humanist discourse upon which political
correctness is predicated, and it is patriarchy’s ability to adapt that has ensured its
survival in a politically aware and correct era.
Before I engage in this discussion of political correctness and how it may be seen to
relate to patriarchal beliefs and ideologies, I wish to make clear that I do not mean to reengage in the political correctness debate surrounding gender in the early to mid 1990s.
Obviously, some of the concerns that I have regarding political correctness emerge from
that debate – but it seems to me, admittedly from a South African perspective in which
issues of political correctness continue to dominate social and media discourses, that
since such early 1990s’ discussions and debates, the form of political correctness itself
has been altered, and in certain situations shifted into becoming something more insidious
in its perpetuation of the ideologies that it claims to counter.
Deborah Cameron raises the issue of right-wing critiques of political correctness as
a form of policing thought, and supports her argument for politically correct speech and
language in her assertion that there can never be “a neutral language untainted by any
political agenda” (23). The dangers of both political correctness becoming a form of
“thought policing,” and of right-wing dismissals of this corrective form of language for
this reason, dominated much discussion about political correctness at this time. However,
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as South African R W Johnson pointed out at the Institute of Race Relations conference
on Political Correctness in 2000, political correctness has come to “[codify a] world of
multiculturalism. The logic of complete egalitarianism applied not only to ethnic
minorities, but to all groups.” (23) As the 1990s progressed, egalitarian discourses that
insisted on the inclusion and acceptance of all ethnic, cultural, and gender groups
prevailed and it became increasingly unlikely that one would hear racist or misogynist
comments made in public spaces, as speech and language became publicly policed in a
more zealous manner than ever before.iv
This policing of language emerges out of, and expands on, Michel Foucault’s
notion of normative modalities of power in modern (or post-enlightenment) society.
Foucault argues, in his much celebrated Discipline and Punish, that in modern societies
which no longer relied on monarchic distributions of power a new modality of power
emerged: one which was far more efficient and pervasive. For Foucault, in the course of
the eighteenth century, the “general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that
were egalitarian in principle was supported by…tiny, everyday, physical mechanisms, by
all those systems of micropower that are essentially nonegalitarian and asymmetrical
which we call the disciplines” (211). This “micropower,” referred to by Foucault as the
“technique, universally widespread, of coercion” (211), is the basis for his notion of
normalization which is a system “in which individuals can be distributed around a norm”
(Rabinow 20). Thus, for Foucault, the modern individual’s urge to conform to societal
norms results in his/her internalizing of societal power, with the result that s/he polices
her/his own speech at all times according to these societal norms. An empty political
correctness may be understood as an excellent example of normative coercion, and
indeed Foucault’s critique of Enlightenment society could be applied to modern
democratic societies. His claim that the “Enlightenment, which discovered the liberties,
also invented the disciplines” (211) could be appropriated to a critique of politically
correct democracies the world over. While political correctness offers liberation from
oppressive discourses of the past, it concurrently invents new forms of discursive
coercion. Furthermore, with political correctness, the private and the public spheres of
those who do not have political allegiance with these newly accepted forms of language
become utterly split from one another. The private sphere becomes a space of
enunciating beliefs that may be considered politically incorrect to like-minded people
who are unlikely to “blow the whistle” on the speaker in a public sphere, while a
sometimes all-too-easy appropriation of politically correct discourse is bandied about in
the public sphere, thereby placing the speaker beyond reproach and his/her ideologies
beyond interrogation. This split discourse becomes quite absurd in many instances.
Another South African example illustrates the point. In the late 1990s, with an
ever-increasing pressure placed on right-wing (racist) groups to integrate into the new
South Africa, to conform to the transformation of the nation, such groups appropriated
the discourses of multiculturalism and political correctness in order to uphold their rightwing ideologies. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging [Afrikaner Resistance Movement],
a far-right Afrikaans separatist group, based much of their argument for a separate
Afrikaans state which would be closed to black (and English speaking white) South
Africans on the discourses of multiculturalism and political correctness. Arguing that the
Afrikaans culture and language required protection, as much as the other ten South
African languages and all of the multiple religious and cultural differences that the
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Rainbow Nation was now expected to be tolerant of, the AWB, although denied this
volkstad by the government, brought their right-wing ideology into the realm of cultural
difference and thereby justified it in the discourses of transformation, reconciliation and
acceptance of the time. It thus, quite absurdly, became politically correct to acknowledge
the perspectives of the most ardent protectors of the past regime within the discourses of
the “new South Africa.” This is clearly an act of appropriating the discourse of struggle
that continues to pervade South African society, but with the effect of inverting the
original meaning of that discourse.
Another example is the current Afrikaner terrorist group, Die Volk [The People],
which argues that if the ANC’s military wing, known as Umkhonto we Sizwe [Spear of
the Nation], resisted the nationalist government with acts of terrorism, then their use of
violence and terrorism is a valid form of resistance to the current dispensation. Of
course, Die Volk fails to understand the complexities of South African political history,
but their artless use of the discourse of struggle to these racist ends is more than
unsettling. A key player in the group goes so far as to refer to himself as a “white
consciousness activist.” While these are extreme, though current, examples of the dangers
of inverted appropriations of political correctness, I believe that a similar appropriation of
the politically correct discourses of gender equality has occurred, though more
pervasively, and cross-culturally and nationally, resulting in similar, and at times entirely
unacknowledged, absurdities that should be of interest to feminists.
In popular culture, the ChickLit and girl power phenomena provide good examples
of such absurdities. Represented in the media as an empowering form of cultural
production for women and girls, these phenomena have been attributed to a postfeminist
“Bridget Jones generation,” and thereby engage in the noble work of defying the
establishment. I would like to ask exactly which establishment is being defied in this
wave of ChickLit films and girl power pop bands: patriarchy or feminism? While the
media, quite rightly, claims that these cultural forms critique and challenge societal
expectations of passive women and girls, it also forecloses feminist critiques of ChickLit
and Girl Power by virtue of putting forth that very argument: that is, if these cultural
forms challenge previous stereotypes of women and girls, any feminist dispute aimed at
them is depicted as being “over-the-top,” anachronistic and as an example of the new
“establishment.” In an article in The Sunday Times, Doris Lessing is presented as a
“feminist writer” whose feminism is aligned with literary snobbishness in her statement
that ChickLit is a series of “instantly forgettable books” (Malala). Moreover, and perhaps
more seriously, that the media can make use of these new representations of women, not
to challenge stereotypes of women, but to simply create a new homogenizing (at best)
and denigrating (at worst) stereotype of women (as seen above in the phrase “Bridget
Jones generation”) is evidence of the fact that in such circumstances the media pays lip
service to political correctness, whilst displaying absolutely no real political awareness
and gender sensitivity in its dealings with these phenomena. To articulate a critique of
this kind of politically correct lip service without any real political content is becoming
increasingly difficult, since politically correct jargon is simply bandied about in response
to any criticism of this kind, thereby absorbing it into what I feel is a very persuasive and
pervasive form of hegemonic patriarchal power. A similar problem can be outlined in
relation to the concept of postfeminism.
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In Postfeminisms, Ann Brooks critiques Susan Faludi’s argument that postfeminism
is a form of backlash (Brooks 3; Faludi 15). For Brooks, the “post” of postfeminism is to
be read in much the same way as one would read the “post” in postmodernism or
postcolonialism, that is, as a site of critical engagement with that which has preceded
these terms. I would argue, however, that Brooks’ appropriation of this particular
understanding of the prefix “post” for feminism, is itself an example of Faludian
backlash. While ever contentious and contended, the terms postmodernism and
postcolonialism can be said to have one thing in common – both terms include the
hegemonic and/or oppressive systems and movements that they seek to critically engage
with: that is, modernism and colonialism. Brooks supports this claim, illustrating her use
of the prefix in her claim that “the ‘post’ of post-colonialism…refers to a continuous
engagement with the effects of colonial occupation” (4). Her use of the prefix in this
manner would thereby indicate that it is feminism, not patriarchy, that postfeminism is
“critically engaging” with. Brooks would not deny this. Indeed, this accords with her
view that second wave feminism was nothing other than “hegemonic” (4) in its modality.
This is not to say that there were not homogenizing aspects to the second wave, but it
seems to me that there is a distinction to be drawn between these homogenizing aspects,
which were altered and transformed with their encounter with black American feminisms,
Third World feminisms etc., and the claim that the second wave was hegemonic in its
impetus. Thus, while Brooks claims that “[p]ostfeminism…occupies a similar ‘critical’
position [as postcolonialism] in regard to earlier feminist frameworks at the same time as
critically engaging with patriarchal and imperialist discourses” (2), I find this statement
problematic on four levels: first, I would question whether postfeminism is conceptually
necessary for feminism, since if there is one shared truth in all feminisms, it is that they
“critically engage with patriarchy”; second, I would argue that the danger of this
understanding of postfeminism, as indicated by its name (why is the term post-patriarchy
not under interrogation here), is that it focuses more on the failings of past feminist
movements than on its own patriarchal environment so that, much as Faludi warned of
the less sophisticated media and popular understanding of the term, what it ultimately
achieves is to undermine politically effective forms of feminism; third, by insisting that
postfeminism is the only space from which to interrogate the problematic aspects of
previous modalities of feminism, is to deny the very self-critical and self-aware aspects
that postmodernism has brought to feminist activities and critiques, and that a third wave
may entail; fourth, Brooks’ postfeminism seems to me to be a careful and sophisticated
apology for second wave feminism, and provides an apology for the new and subtle
forms of patriarchy expounded above.
Julia Kristeva observes a broader waning of political affect, which she refers to as a
“power vacuum” (4). She argues that “we no longer speak of culpability but of public
menace; we no longer speak of fault…but of dangers. Instead of responsibility, there is
liability; the idea of responsibility-without-fault is becoming acceptable” (5). This
decline of social responsibility, however, cannot be read as a politically neutral space,
and in this respect Kristeva’s concept of a power vacuum is misleading. It is my view
that discourses of political correctness and multiculturalism are in danger of becoming
understood as a part of such a “power vacuum,” since, as Kristeva herself argues,
“perhaps we have in fact arrived at a so-called liberal society in which there is no
surveillance and no punishment….Though we are not punished, we are, in effect,
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normalized: in place of the prohibition or power that cannot be found, disciplinary and
administrative punishments multiply, repressing or, rather, normalizing everyone” (5).
Thus, following Foucault, Kristeva understands power to be distributed via normalization
and internal surveillance, rather than external surveillance and punishment. Moreover,
she quite accurately points to the pervasiveness and subtlety of this modality of power as
the reason for why revolt has been effaced in twenty-first century democratic societies.
How does one take arms against a protean enemy, one that does not present itself in
explicit and definite forms, but makes use of the various liberal discourses to hand, not to
challenge the actual distribution of power in society (and I believe one could argue this
not only in terms of gender, but in terms of socio-economics, race, sexuality, nationality
and a host of other political areas), but to veil such politics and thereby effectively ruin
any attempts to revolt against and resist these power relations?
Kristeva makes a similar point with reference to Sigmund Freud’s Totem and
Taboo, in which he expands on his theory of the Oedipal Triangle in order to articulate
how societies come to formulate taboos and their corresponding norms (which, in Freud’s
argument, are represented and symbolized through the Totem).v That is to say, the
Oedipal taboo of incest, indeed the Oedipal triangle altogether, is used as a blueprint
through which the broader workings and distributions of power in society are analyzed
and understood. Kristeva recalls Freud’s argument, specifically those aspects of it that
relate to the subject’s urge to appropriate the “father’s” paternal attributes:
‘I’ felt flattered to be promoted to the level of someone who could, if not be
the father, at least acquire his qualities, identify with his power; ‘I’ was
associated with this power; ‘I’ was not excluded; ‘I’ was one of those who
obeyed him and were satisfied with that. But sometimes this identification
with power no longer works; ‘I’ feel excluded; ‘I’ can no longer locate power,
which has become normalizing and falsifiable. (14)
Kristeva’s reading of Freud is thus positioned at the nexus of the issues of gender and
normalization and can thus provide contemporary feminists with an important warning:
having “acquired” some of the “father’s” qualities, mostly in terms of the ability to
identify with his power – an acquisition that we must acknowledge the first and second
waves of feminism for – we must not forget that the power of the father continues to exert
itself, and while we may find it increasingly difficult to locate this power, we must
fervently continue our feminist critiques of such patriarchal (and, via the psychoanalytic
model, paternal) forms of power. The contemporary debates regarding feminism must,
therefore, be prepared to sift through the layers of veiled language and misappropriations
of politically correct language and/or multicultural discourses, since it is only once this
process has been effected that we will be able to engage critically with contemporary
forms of patriarchy.
I will conclude with an example of an event that occurred on campus at the
University of the Witwatersrand, the university at which I teach, on the 27 May 2002 at a
Men’s Residence march against sexual abuse. The background to the event is significant,
since the march was a response to two cases of rape brought against two Men’s
Residence students, both of whom were expelled from the university. Ostensibly, Men’s
Residence organized the march, by way of showing their renunciation of the two men
charged. The event was, therefore, applauded by the various gender groups and
committees on campus – both student and staff-based. It seemed that this march,
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organized by men and for men, was a step in the right direction – an active stance by male
students against sexual abuse appeared to be very much in line with the ethos of
reconciliation and reparation that the university upholds. The marchers were wearing tshirts that read “Men’s Residence against Sexual Abuse” and holding placards with
seemingly reconstructed slogans, such as “Real Men Don’t Abuse.” I was present at this
march and felt very pleased to be associated with a university at which gender politics
were not only still alive, but in which we could say we had moved to a new phase in
which even something as masculinist in its ethos as a Men’s Residence hall, could be so
actively involved in gender related politics.
A few days later it was brought to my attention that complaints were being made
about this march by Sotho speaking women students. The speaker for the occasion’s
opening remarks, which were in Sotho, and thus incomprehensible to many of those
watching the proceedings (and perhaps even involved in the proceedings), were “Men!
We must work hard for Cunt!” The speaker then went on to make politically correct
statements in English about sexual abuse, all of which were heartily applauded by the
women observing the march (the non-Sotho speakers that is).vi
This is clearly problematic, in and of itself, but what is more serious is that the
complainants have chosen, thus far, to not take action against the speaker in question
because with only four official complaints, these women are (quite rightly) intimidated by
the sheer numbers of students at Men’s Residence – all of whom will stand steadfast in
their support of one another. When Men’s Residence became aware that such a
complaint had been made, the response was an angry one. They did not deny the
statement, but could not see why they were being critiqued for it when the purposes of the
march were, in their minds, directed at sexual abuse. It has become clear in how this
episode is playing itself out at the university that these young men are entirely ignorant as
to the ways in which such statements offend women. To them, women’s rights are solely
situated in the realm of sexual violation and rape – the rest is, evidently, fair game. More
sinister is the implication that the Men’s Residence representative was referring to the
actual cases of rape. This can be read in one of two ways. Either, one cannot just “have”
sex, one has to work for it, or, the march itself is the “work” being done to “get” sex. The
latter reading seems to correspond perfectly to the argument that I have expounded
above: these students believe themselves to be politically correct, liberal and gender
aware. How is it possible to articulate a feminist response to such an event, where the
knee-jerk response will be to point out this faux political awareness?
Furthermore, the event is only being relayed sub rosa on campus, a confidence
that I have no compunction whatsoever in contravening since it seems to me that the way
in which the university is dealing with this event accords with Kristeva’s aforementioned
statement that we are living in societies that no longer “speak of fault, but of dangers.”
The student who made this comment should, in my view, be held to account for his
statements. Instead, he simply dismisses the accusations and retains the only video copy
of the march, which the university has not obtained. Moreover, the university, in
avoiding the dangers of real political conflict on campus, has not intervened on behalf of
the handful of Sotho speaking women complainants, but appears to be protecting the
representative of Men’s Residence in its refusal to allow this to be spoken about in a
public forum.vii It seems to me that to be complicit in the protection of those who are
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willing to publicly make these sorts of misogynist statements is to be complicit in
misogyny itself, and to become an apologist for the new wave of patriarchy.
As with the example of media discussions of ChickLit and girl power, it becomes
clear in this instance that a more thorough political correctness is not going to solve the
problem. Indeed, if anything, it is going to make the realm of political inquiry even more
opaque, and thus render feminist critiques even more invisible. I am not recommending a
new wave of even more zealous political correctness. Instead, it seems to me that a “third
wave” of feminism could make use of the consciousness-raising modalities of earlier
forms, in that to raise awareness of how to read gendered codes in all popular media, in
the academy, in schools and in the political sphere seems to be the only way to empower
young women and men against the barrage of codes and messages that continue to
perpetuate patriarchy on a variety of levels, and in multiple ways. Unlike postfeminism
which, despite Brooks’ insistence that it is more sophisticated than this, is largely
constructed in the media (and since most consumers of popular culture and media are not
engaging with these forms within a critical space, such as the academy) and suggests that
there is no longer a need for critical engagement with mass and popular cultural
productions and reproductions of gendered stereotypes, a third wave of consciousnessraising would give young people the tools with which to critically engage with their
gendered world. This would not involve the policing of patriarchal forms, but would
rather insist that those forms are understood for what they are – would rip off the mask of
the politically correct that is at present serving a dangerous re-entrenchment of patriarchal
codes and norms.
Moreover, such consciousness-raising cannot occur only within the academy but
should occur within those very realms of the media and popular culture. There are
already some examples of this, most of which take the form of somewhat obvious
reclamations; for example, the representation of househusbands in advertisements for
domestic products previously associated exclusively with women. Many of these
advertisements are also extremely problematic in that many of them present a parody of
alternative families and most of them are hetero-normative. Thus, a far more thorough
and coherent campaign needs to be instigated in the realm of media and popular
production – one which is presented as a feminist politics. In the last century, patriarchy
has adapted to feminist inquiry, but it has, ultimately, survived. What is required is that
feminism adapt as feminism, without apologizing for its political impetus, so as to oppose
these new and insidious forms of patriarchy.
i

Lecturer, School of Literature and Language Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, South
Africa. For comments contact Ashleigh Harris at aharris@languages.wits.ac.za.
ii
Sheila Rowbotham’s A Century of Women: The History of Women in Britain and the United States
provides a thorough introduction to the history of patriarchy in the western world.
iii
Liz McQuiston’s From Suffragettes to She-Devils: Women’s Liberation and Beyond provides
excellent examples of the severity of such anti-suffrage campaigns.
iv
The South African press provides a good example of this – as well as the Human Right
Commission, under Barney Pityana, that accused J. M. Coetzee of perpetuating racist stereotypes in his
Booker prize winning novel, Disgrace.
v
For Freud’s complete argument regarding the relationship between Totems and prohibitions in
what he refers to as “savage” societies see Totem and Taboo (1-16).
vi
Given that there are eleven official languages in South Africa, it is no surprise that not everyone
present at the march would understand this comment and that there would be only a handful of Sotho
speaking women present to hear the statement.
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vii

Interestingly, the event has not been declared sub judice as yet, hence this article.
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